Introduction
What are the roles of increasing women's educational attainment and declining infant and child mortality in contributing to fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa? SubSaharan Africa was the last major world region to experience the fertility decline that all industrialized countries have gone through and that much of the developing world has experienced. It has uniquely high fertility: for the period 2015-2020 the United Nations (2015) estimates (medium variant) the total fertility rate (TFR) at 4.75 for sub-S a ha ra n A f ric a , c o mpa re d to 2.15 f o r A s ia a nd 2 .05 f or L at i n A me ric a a nd t he Caribbean. The ongoing fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa has been comparatively slow and subject to stalling (Bongaarts 2008; Bongaarts and Casterline 2013; Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2008; Shapiro et al. 2013) . As a consequence of the late onset of fertility transition, the prevalence of stalling of fertility decline, and the slow pace of decline (Bongaarts and Casterline 2013; Shapiro et al. 2013) , sub-Saharan Africa has an overall level of fertility that is well over twice the levels in Asia and Latin America.
As we discuss in more detail in the theoretical framework section that follows, there are various pathways by which increased women's education contributes to lower fertility. Likewise, there is evidence that reductions in infant and child mortality also contribute to fertility decline in the region.
Women's schooling is low in sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations 2010; Shapiro 2012), although it has been increasing over time (Garenne 2012) , both absolutely and relative to the schooling of men (Schultz 1993; Barro and Lee 2013) . These increases should contribute to the ongoing fertility transition in the region: At the aggregate level, within sub-Saharan Africa, countries with comparatively higher levels of women's educational attainment are the countries that tend to have lower levels of fertility (Shapiro 2012) and to be more advanced in their fertility transition (Garenne 2012) . However, using aggregated data in a longitudinal perspective, Garenne (2012) finds that the percentage of educated women is low at the onset of the fertility decline (2.2 years of schooling, on average), and he finds no correlation between the speed of fertility decline and the mean level of education at the onset.
Similarly, infant and child mortality is higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia and Latin America (United Nations 2015). In most countries there have been declines in infant and child mortality, which, based on analysis of aggregate data, have contributed to the fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa (Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2008; Shapiro 2012 ).
We use individual-level micro data and a decomposition technique for analyzing differences or changes to quantify the importance of increased women's education and reduced infant and child mortality in contributing to the declines in fertility. Data is from the Demographic and Health Surveys, and comes from urban and rural places in all 31 countries that have had at least two surveys. These countries account for 86% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa.
The method entails decomposing observed changes in fertility to identify the magnitudes of those changes that are attributable to changes in different factors, most notably women's education and infant and child mortality. The decompositions control not only for changes in these two variables, but also for changes in the age composition of the population of women. We examine overall changes between the first and the last surveys, beginning in the mid-1980s and up to the present. We provide separate estimates for urban and rural places: Garenne and Joseph (2002) show that the fertility transition in the region began first in urban areas, with a lag prior to the onset of fertility decline in rural places, and Shapiro and Tambashe (2002) emphasize that urban and rural areas in the region differ in terms of both the timing of the onset of fertility decline and the pace of that decline as the fertility transition unfolds.
We first provide a theoretical framework, and then review changes in fertility, education, mortality, and mean age of women in urban and rural sub-Saharan Africa (section 3). We describe the decomposition method and the data in section 4, and proceed to the decomposition analysis in section 5. The conclusion is presented in section 6.
Theoretical framework
The underlying theoretical framework for our analyses is the Easterlin framework for fertility analysis (Easterlin 1975; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985) . In this framework, fertility is the outcome of the interaction of the demand for children (the number of surviving children that parents would want in the absence of costs of fertility regulation), the supply of children (the number of surviving children that parents would have if they made no effort to control their fertility), and the objective and subjective costs of fertility regulation. If demand exceeds supply there is no motivation for fertility control, while if supply exceeds demand there is such motivation. Whether fertility hardship as a contributor to fertility decline has also been emphasized by EloundouEnyegue, Stokes, and Cornwell (2000) , Antoine (2006) , and Gurmu and Mace (2008) . In addition, there is some evidence that very high population density, as in Rwanda and Burundi, contributes to a lower ideal number of children and lower fertility (Lutz, Testa, and Penn 2006; Shapiro 2017) . Finally, changes in preferences for children (i.e., ideal number of children) that cut across educational groups could be an independent source of fertility decline.
Overview of changes in fertility, education, mortality, and mean age of women
Before we examine data for urban and rural places separately, we provide a brief overview of data at the national level, to facilitate comparisons with earlier research. The 31 countries present considerable variation in the pace of decline in fertility (Shapiro and Tenikue 2015) . For all of the countries taken together, the average TFR in the first survey (measuring fertility during the three years prior to the survey) was 6.0, while the average TFR in the last survey was 5.2. Thus, over a span that on average was a little more than 16 years, the TFR has declined on average by a little less than 0.05 per year.
This pace is in line with the recent decline in sub-Saharan Africa. Shapiro et al. (2013) find that the average decline in sub-Saharan Africa between the two most recent Demographic and Health Surveys was 0.05 children per year. Going back over a longer time period, Bongaarts (2008) reports an average annual decline in the TFR of 0.07 from about 1992 to 1998 and a lower value (average decline of 0.02 per year) from 1998 to 2004. Using data from 31 sub-Saharan African countries, Garenne (2008) reports that the onset of fertility decline in most of the countries took place between 1960 and 2000 and that the average speed of fertility decline was approximately 0.1 children per woman per year.
We first examine the TFRs in the first and last Demographic and Health Surveys, and their variations. The data is shown in Table 1 for urban and rural places, along with the dates of the first and last survey. For all of these countries taken together, the average TFR in the first survey in urban areas was 4.7, while the average TFR in the last survey was 3.9. Over a span of on average a little more than 16 years, there was a 17% decline in average urban TFRs and the average annual decline in the TFR in urban places was just over 0.05 per year. In rural areas the average TFR in the first survey was 6.5, while in the last survey it was 6.0, corresponding to an 8% overall decline and an average annual decline of a little more than 0.03. While the average pace of decline is slow in sub-Saharan Africa there is considerable variation across countries, in both urban and rural areas. Only 19 of the 31 countries have had declines in both urban and rural fertility. Of these countries, 11 have experienced more rapid declines in urban areas, while in the other eight the fertility decline has been more rapid in rural places. As mentioned above, the rapid fertility decline in Eritrea, especially in the countryside, may result in part from a border conflict with Ethiopia during the late 1990s (Blanc 2004; Woldemicael 2008) .
Six countries experienced declines in urban fertility but not in rural fertility: Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Niger, and Zambia. The Congo Republic and Gabon had increased fertility in both urban and rural places, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo had stable urban fertility and increasing rural fertility. Finally, Lesotho, a low-fertility country, had increased urban fertility and reduced rural fertility.
The most common outcome is for fertility to decline in both urban and rural places, but in nearly 40% of the countries this is not the case. Fertility decline has been more prevalent in urban areas, being present in 28 countries as compared to the 23 countries that experienced rural fertility decline.
Map 1 shows the annual pace of decline in urban areas, and Map 2 does the same for rural places. The greater number of countries with an absence of fertility decline in rural areas is apparent. Rapid fertility decline is evident in both urban and rural places in Western, Eastern, and Southern Africa, while Middle Africa is least likely to have experienced fertility decline (regions are defined following the United Nations 2015 definitions).
Patterns of fertility decline in urban and rural places as the fertility transition proceeds are shown in Figure 1 . Using all pairs of consecutive DHS surveys, the figure shows how average declines in the urban and rural TFRs vary as a function of the corresponding average national TFRs, as of the initial DHS in the pair. At high levels of initial TFR, average urban fertility declines relatively rapidly, while average rural fertility declines distinctly more slowly. At the medium levels of the last TFR, urban fertility declines more slowly than in the high-fertility group, while among rural residents, compared to the high-fertility group, fertility decline is somewhat more rapid in Figure 1a but slightly slower in Figure 1b .
Map 1:
Average annual pace of decline in the total fertility rate between the first and last Demographic and Health Survey, urban areas In both cases the pace of urban fertility decline remains higher than that of rural fertility decline, but the gap between the two has narrowed. Figures 1a and 1b differ by the cutoffs for distinguishing the three fertility groups, this differentiation serving as a sensitivity analysis. In the low-fertility group, in Figure 1a urban fertility decline has fallen further, to below the pace of rural fertility decline, while in Figure 1b average urban fertility decline is negative -i.e., urban fertility has stalled and increased, while the pace of rural fertility decline has slowed but exceeds that of urban areas. We believe that this is evidence of increasing numbers of African cities having actual fertility close to ideal fertility. In a study of a smaller number of sub-Saharan countries, Shapiro and Tambashe (2002) find a similar pattern of fertility decline being initially more rapid in urban places but eventually reaching a stage where rural fertility decline is faster than that in urban places. Table 2 shows the mean years of schooling of women of reproductive age, and the percentage who have never been to school. Between the first and last survey, mean years of schooling increased in both urban and rural places in every country. Similarly, the percentage of women with no schooling declined almost everywhere except for urban and rural Lesotho and urban Congo, where the very low percentages with no schooling (1-3%) remained stable.
On average, urban women had 5.3 years of schooling as of the first survey and 7.0 years as of the last survey, an increase of 1.7 years over a period that averaged just over 16 years. Among rural women, mean years of schooling increased from 2.5 as of the first survey to 3.8 at the last survey, an increase of 1.3 years. The average percentage of urban women who had never been to school declined from 29% at the first survey to 19% at the last survey; the corresponding numbers for rural women declined from 55% to 41%. On each measure, then, rural women were worse off by roughly a factor of two.
There is substantial variation in the levels and changes in women's schooling, both across countries and between urban and rural areas. Typically, mean years of schooling increased more rapidly in urban areas, but in five countries (Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe) mean schooling increased more rapidly in rural areas, and in two others (the DRC and Gabon) the increase in mean years of schooling was the same in urban and rural places. Of these seven countries with comparatively strong growth in rural schooling, five had rather high educational attainment at the outset. Hence, the strong rural growth presumably reflects the fact that the process of expansion of schooling from urban to rural areas that typically unfolds over time in developing countries is farther along in those countries that already have a high level of schooling. However, for most countries that process is at an earlier stage, and schooling is still increasing more rapidly in urban places. Notes: Countries with at least two Demographic and Health Surveys. Table 3 shows 5 q 0 , the infant and child mortality rate, calculated over the past 10 years prior to the survey. As with increased educational attainment, reduced infant and child mortality between the first and last survey in both urban and rural places is close to universal. Only rural Chad, urban and rural Lesotho, and urban Zimbabwe did not show declining mortality, and, except for Zimbabwe, the increases in mortality were trivial. In every country except for Tanzania, mortality is higher in rural areas, but in some cases the urban-rural difference in mortality is modest (for example, Gabon, Kenya, Namibia) while in others it is substantial (for example, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, and Niger).
Among urban women the average rate of infant and child mortality fell by 38% between the first and last survey. Among rural women, 5 q 0 declined by 36%. Mortality is higher in rural areas by a little more than 30% on average. There is considerable diversity of experience across countries. Reflecting the larger average absolute declines in rural mortality, in 19 of the countries the decline in the rural mortality rate exceeded the decline in the urban mortality rate. However, in 11 countries the decline in the mortality rate was greater in urban places.
In the decompositions that we carry out, the age composition of women of reproductive age is an important control variable. This is because the dependent variable is children ever born, and the value of this variable increases with age, other things being equal. Here we examine the mean age of these women and how it changes between the first and last survey. Since we know from stable population theory that given the level of mortality, higher-fertility populations are younger than lower-fertility populations, in places experiencing fertility decline the population of women of reproductive age will tend to get older over time. This phenomenon will presumably be more common in urban places than in rural ones, given the lower urban fertility. At the same time, the age pattern of female rural-urban migration will also influence age distributions in both locations.
To the extent that the population of reproductive age gets older over time, this will partially mask fertility decline, since the aging will result in increased numbers of children ever born. Consequently, we control for the woman's age in the regressions in order to take account of this factor. Notes: Countries with at least two DHSs. Data on infant and child mortality are for the 10-year period preceding the survey. They are extracted from the webpage http://www.statcompiler.com/en/. Table 4 shows that in urban areas, consistent with the observed declines in fertility, 25 of the countries experienced increasing mean age of women. In rural places, mean age of women of reproductive age increased in 20 countries. The general pattern, then, is increased mean age, but somewhat more so for urban women. We have used the TFR as our measure of fertility to this point. However, the TFR is a measure based on aggregated data, and for this study we use micro data for our decomposition analyses. For each individual, then, our measure of fertility is the number of children ever born, or cumulative fertility, and mean number of children ever born is a key variable in the analyses. The mean number of children ever born is sensitive to even small changes in the average age of women of reproductive age.
It is useful to compare the levels of the TFR and the mean number of children ever born. In urban areas the levels of these two measures are very highly correlated, with the correlation being about +0.9 for both the first and last surveys. In rural areas the correlation coefficient is about +0.7 for the first survey and +0.8 for the last survey. Given these high correlations, the analyses below of changes in the determinants of fertility and their consequences for fertility behavior, using children ever born as the measure of fertility, are useful for understanding the ongoing fertility transition in subSaharan Africa. Oaxaca (1973) introduced a procedure for analyzing differences in wages between two groups. Consider wages as a consequence of earnings functions that reflect both endowments of factors that influence wages and the payoffs to those factors. From this perspective, two groups may have different wages as a consequence of different endowments of wage-relevant factors (such as schooling and work experience) and/or different payoffs to given factors (as might occur with labor market discrimination). The Oaxaca decomposition procedure allows the assessment of the importance of different endowments of relevant factors in accounting for the observed difference in wages between two groups.
Decomposition method and data

Decomposing changes in fertility over time
The procedure developed by Oaxaca (1973) and subsequently refined (Oaxaca and Ransom 1994 ) has been used in many studies of wage differences between groups. However, it may also be applied to analysis of differences in fertility (Bundervoet 2014 ). Here we are interested in changes in fertility over time, and in the importance of changes in the educational attainment of women and in mortality in accounting for the fertility changes.
The number of children ever born to a woman in period i, Yi (i=1,2), is considered a s a l i ne a r f u nc t i o n o f a s e t o f w o m e n' s c ha ra c t e ri s t i c s X i (i=1,2), a vector of parameters (β i ) and an error term (e i ).
The average number of childre n ever born to a w oman in the sample is on the regression line and can be written as
where X i is the vector of average values of X i and β i is the vector of estimated values of β i .
For any arbitrary vector β* we have that
Equation 1 is a decomposition equation of the linear regression model. It expresses the change in the means of the dependent variable over two periods as a function of changes in means of the set of women's characteristics (first term on the right-hand side) and changes in the regression coefficients (two last terms on the right-hand side). W e c a n t he n c o m p u t e t he c o nt r i b u t i o n o f e a c h o f t he s e f a c to rs ( a s w e l l a s t he contributions of changes in other characteristics that influence fertility) to overall fertility decline. The literature has considered various values for β* and some of them display some weaknesses (Oaxaca and Ransom 1994; Sinning, Hahan, and Bauer 2008) . Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) , this paper sets β* to be parameters estimated on the pooled sample. It reflects the set of parameters that should prevail irrespective of the time period.
We first estimate the effects of educational attainment, mortality, and age on cumulative fertility (children ever born), using data from the first and last Demographic and Health Surveys for each country. We estimated the β 1 coefficients using the first survey for each country, the β 2 coefficients using the last survey, and the β* coefficients using the pooled data. The estimated coefficients from the pooled data are then used in conjunction with changes in the means of the explanatory variables to identify the consequences for fertility of the changes in age, mortality, and education between the first and last survey.
Educational attainment is measured by a series of dummy variables indicating the number of years of schooling completed (0, 1-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13+) . The reference category is those with 1-6 years of schooling, representing primary schooling in a system with six years of primary school. However, there is variation across countries in grades per level; for example, in some countries, there are seven years to primary school. For this reason we use years of schooling rather than level. In addition, we break up what would be secondary schooling in a 6-6 system into three groups, as previous research (Shapiro and Tambashe 2003; Shapiro 2012) shows that these three secondary-school groups have distinctly different fertility.
Infant and child mortality is proxied by the percentage of children born to women in the respondent's sample cluster who have died. This is a measure of mortality that pertains to the small area in which each woman resides. It is not a measure of the infant and child mortality rate, but since most of the deaths it counts are likely to be of infants and children under five, our mortality measure should be highly correlated with the local area's infant and child mortality rate. The correlation between levels of our measure of mortality and the reported infant and child mortality rate exceeds +0.96 in both urban and rural places as of the first survey, and exceeds +0.92 in both places of reside nce as of the last survey . Our measure s hould thus be a good indicator of women's perceptions of the level of mortality.
Changes in mean values of the variables
Appendix Table A-1 shows the detailed results for individual countries with respect to changes in the mean values of the variables between the first and last surveys, for the v ari ab le s us e d in t he re g re s s io ns . M ic ro data is no t av ail ab le fo r E ri t re a, s o t he Appendix tables cover 30 countries.
Consider first the education dummy variables. In nearly every country the proportion of women with no schooling declined between the first and last survey in both urban and rural places. On average, the decline was about 35% in urban areas and 25% in rural areas. The pace of decline varied substantially across countries and was considerably slower in relative terms among the countries that had particularly low educational attainment at the outset.
For example, of the seven countries with more than 50% of urban women of reproductive age with no schooling as of the first survey, the average decline in this percentage as of the last survey was 13 percentage points, a 23% decline; while among the 23 countries with fewer than 50% of urban women with no schooling at the first survey, the average decline was 10 percentage points, more than 45% of the initial level. Among rural women, when 50% or more had no schooling at the first survey, there was a 15-point decline in that percentage at the last survey, or nearly a 20% decline, while in rural places with fewer than 50% with no schooling at the outset, the average decline was 11 points, almost 45%.
At the other end of the education distribution, the general tendency for each of the three education groups with nine or more years of schooling was for the proportion to increase over time, with this being the case for 90% of the 180 feasible comparisons. However, particularly in rural areas, these high-education groups remained small. More broadly, these changes in educational attainment reflect the increased access to both primary and (especially in urban places) secondary schooling that women have experienced during the past 20-30 years.
Declines in mortality, based on our measure reflecting mortality of children in each cluster of residence in urban and rural places, were universal within this group of countries, with one exception: urban Zimbabwe, which had the lowest mortality of all countries as of the first survey and, despite a slight increase, the fifth-lowest level as of the last survey. In some cases these declines were substantial and in others quite modest. The correlations between infant and child mortality rates reported in Table 3 and the mortality measures reported in Table A -1 are greater than +0.9 in both urban and rural areas and for both first and last surveys.
Changes in mean age of women aged 15-49 were mostly increases, but sometimes there were decreases. In some cases the changes were modest and in others more substantial. All of these changes influence the decompositions.
Regression results
The first step in the decomposition procedure is to estimate regressions with the dependent variable, the number of children ever born to each woman, regressed on variables indicating her educational attainment, the extent of mortality locally, and the woman's age. The data from the first and last Demographic and Health Survey is pooled, regressions are estimated using weighted data, and the resulting coefficients indicate the effects of each variable on the number of children ever born. The samples for each of these regressions consist of all urban women and all rural women aged 15-49, respectively.
Regression results for each country are in Appendix Table A-2. The estimated coefficients differ across countries, and the vast majority of these coefficients are highly significant. There are some consistent similarities in the results for the different countries. Consider the coefficients for the education dummy variables. Compared to women with 1-6 years of schooling (the reference group), women with no schooling tend to have significantly higher fertility, a little more so in urban places than in rural areas. Women with higher levels of schooling tend to have significantly lower numbers of children ever born, and typically the negative impact of schooling gets larger in absolute value as schooling level increases, in urban and especially in rural places.
These results may be seen more easily in Table 5 , which shows the (unweighted) average values of the urban and rural coefficients across the 30 countries for which micro data are available.
Controlling for a woman's age and the level of mortality of children in her cluster of residence, on average urban women with no schooling have had nearly a third of a c h i l d m o r e t h a n w o m e n w i t h 1 -6 y e a r s o f s c h o o l i n g ; a m o n g r u r a l w o m e n t h e corresponding differential is only half as large. Both urban and rural women with 7-8 y e ars o f s c hoo ling hav e lo w e r f e rti lity tha n t he i r c o unt e rpa rts w it h 1-6 y e ars o f education, other things being equal, by close to 0.3 children, on average. As educational attainment increases beyond this level the magnitudes of the negative coefficients for the schooling groups rise in absolute value and at an increasing rate, especially among rural residents. Similar evidence of increasingly stronger negative effects of schooling on fertility as schooling increases is reported in Shapiro (2012). The coefficients of the mortality variable typically have a small, positive value, slightly higher in urban places, on average, indicating that where mortality is higher, fertility tends to be higher, as anticipated. And finally, the number of children ever born increases with age, other things being equal, but at a decreasing rate.
Decomposition analysis
Appendix Table A-3 provides results of the decompositions that assess the contributions of different variables to the changes in fertility (children ever born) between the first and last Demographic and Health Surveys. Effects of the changes in means of the different education dummy variables, evaluated using the individual regression coefficients, are aggregated so that we see the consequences of changes in the group of education variables. The effects of changes in age and age squared are reported as the effect of the change in age.
Consider some examples to illustrate the interpretation of the numbers in the table. The increased educational attainment in urban Benin accounts for just over a third of the decline in the average number of children ever born between 1996 and 2012. By contrast, the reduction in mortality experienced in urban Benin implies a decline in the number of children ever born equivalent to more than 80% of the actual decline of 0.47 children. The increase in the mean age of urban women aged 15-49 of 0.7 years, by itself, would have increased fertility by almost 30% of the observed decline, and hence has a negative value. The three variables, taken together, account for 91% of the change in the number of children ever born between the first and last survey.
In urban Cameroon, increased education accounts for almost two-thirds of the fertility decline between 1991 and 2011 of more than 0.6 children in the average number of children ever born. The decline in mortality in Cameroon accounts for only 11% of the reduction in fertility. Finally, the slight increase in mean age of women of reproductive age between 1991 and 2011, since it would imply an increase in the number of children ever born, gets a minus sign for its influence, given that fertility declined.
In rural Namibia, increased schooling accounted for almost 90% of the decline in fertility, while reduced mortality had only a very small impact on fertility. By contrast, in rural Senegal more than two-thirds of the fertility decline reflected declining mortality, and increased education only contributed modestly to the decline in fertility.
These different examples illustrate that in some countries increased women's schooling accounts for the lion's share of changes in urban and rural fertility, while in other countries it is reductions in mortality that are predominant in accounting for declines in fertility. Before going into detail on this point, however, consider some peculiarities of the table.
The decompositions shown in Table A -3 omit results for a few urban locations and a substantial number of rural locations. In particular, when there is an increase in our measure of fertility (as in urban Congo and in the rural areas of nine countries), factors contributing to lower fertility will have negative signs, since their effect is to run counter to the observed fertility increase. In addition, in urban areas of three countries (Chad, the DRC, and Lesotho) and in rural areas of six countries there was a decline in the mean number of children ever born, but the decline was quite small. Since that decline is the denominator in the decomposition calculations, the result of having small values of the denominator is inordinately high values for the impact of individual variables. The table thus includes decompositions only for those places that experienced a decline in the mean number of children ever born between the first and last survey of at least 0.10. This constituted 26 of the 30 urban areas, but, reflecting the slower pace of rural fertility decline, only 15 of the 30 rural areas showed reduced fertility of at least 0.10.
For the 26 countries whose urban areas experienced a decline in mean number of children ever born of at least 0.1, the unweighted mean contribution of increased women's schooling accounts for 54% of the fertility decline, while the corresponding figure for improvements in mortality is 30%. In 17 of those countries, education plays a more important role than mortality in contributing to reduced urban fertility, while in seven other countries mortality is more important for urban fertility, and in two countries they have about the same impact.
Among the 15 countries with a rural fertility decline of at least 0.1 children, the mean contribution of increased education represented 30% of the fertility decline, while reduced mortality accounted for 35% of the decline. Mortality had a greater impact than education on reducing rural fertility in eight countries, while the reverse was true in six countries, and in rural Rwanda the two factors had equal weight. Rwanda is a country in which education and mortality only contribute modestly to fertility decline, as is also the case for neighboring Burundi. These two countries have the highest population density by far in the region, and this high density appears to contribute to preferences for low fertility (Lutz, Testa, and Penn 2006; Shapiro 2017) .
Because our goal was to carry out these decompositions for as many countries as possible, we included all countries that met the minimum requirement of having had at least two surveys. We used the first and last surveys for each country so as to maximize the duration of the period of observation. These durations ranged from five years for Lesotho, one of the five countries that only initiated DHSs in the 2000s (Congo, the DRC, Ethiopia, and Gabon are the others), up to 27 years for Liberia, one of nine countries that initiated DHSs during the 1980s. One consequence is that the 'first survey' takes place in some countries in the 1980s and in other countries not until the 2000s. In the presence of this diversity in the timing of first and last surveys, it is possible that there may be period effects that go undetected in our approach, which, by including all countries with at least two surveys without taking account of the timing of those surveys, cannot be identified.
3 Pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is an example of a policy with the capability to create a period effect. With the MDGs being pursued between 2000 and 2015, it is plausible to suggest (as did one of the reviewers) that countries with all surveys in the period 2000 or later might have benefited in terms of fertility decline, presumably from more rapid education increases and mortality declines.
To test for period effects, we compared our preferred decomposition results, for all countries taken together, to results from alternative scenarios. These comparisons are reported in Table 6 . To avoid an MDG effect, the first scenario, proposed by a reviewer, limited the sample to countries with a first survey no later than the mid-1990s and a last survey in 2000 or later. This removed 11 countries from the decompositions, and the average contributions of education and mortality to fertility decline in urban places were r e d u c e d s o m e w h a t . T h i s i n d i c a t e s , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a n M D G e f f e c t , t h a t t h e contributions among the late-starting countries were greater. In rural areas the results were essentially unchanged. Scenario 2 extends the first-survey limit to 1999, resulting in 6 countries being removed. Results for urban places are essentially the same as those for all 30 countries; the contribution of mortality is a little greater in rural places.
Scenarios 3 and 4 each divide the full sample into two groups differentiated by the year of the first survey, with 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 being the respective dividing lines (these close dividing lines represent a sensitivity analysis, and move six countries from the late to the early group). It is clear in each case that the later-starting countries show a greater impact of education and mortality on urban fertility decline, and while results for rural areas are somewhat variable there is evidence of greater impact on rural fertility decline as well.
A few conclusions emerge from the decompositions. First, both increased schooling and reduced mortality have contributed to fertility declines in urban and rural places. In urban areas increased educational attainment is more often the dominant factor, while in rural areas mortality decline is slightly more likely to be more important for fertility decline. Over all, on average these two factors account for almost 85% of urban fertility decline and nearly two-thirds of the slower rural fertility decline.
Two important proximate determinants of fertility, age at first union and contraceptive use, have not been included in the analyses. There are two major problems with using these variables. First, endogeneity with respect to education: these variables are related to education, so including them would reduce the estimated impact of education by attributing its consequences (later marriage, more and better contraception) to these other variables. The analysis here is essentially very close to a reduced form. Even here, there is an endogenous component to mortality: bettereducated women experience lower infant and child mortality. If we omit mortality from the regressions, the impact of women's education in contributing to explaining fertility decline increases in all countries and locations where mortality had previously had some relevance. The increases are small, presumably because there is also a substantial exogenous component to mortality decline reflecting improvements in medical technology and in the delivery of health care services, but omitting mortality shows that including a partially endogenous variable reduces the estimated contribution of women's education.
Having noted our preferred analytical strategy, we also estimated regression equations for children ever born, including age at first union and modern contraceptive use. More specifically, to avoid endogeneity we used the average age at first marriage in the respondent's cluster of residence, and current use of modern contraception in the cluster. As anticipated, explicitly controlling for these proximate determinants reduces the estimated contribution of education per se. At the same time, it highlights the roles of these two pathways.
Results of the decompositions controlling for these two proximate determinants of fertility are shown in Appendix Table A-3, beneath the reduced-form results for each country. The average contribution of education per se to fertility decline falls by almost seven percentage points in urban places and by just over five percentage points in rural places. Declines are even larger for the average contribution to fertility decline of mortality decreases. We believe that this reflects correlations at the cluster level among mortality, age at marriage, and contraception, such that the mortality effects in the reduced form are biased upward. Finally, we note that, on average, inclusion of mean age at marriage in the cluster accounted for 40% of urban fertility decline and 30% of rural fertility decline, while current use of modern contraception represented another 11% of the urban and 15% of the rural fertility decrease.
Conclusion
Analyses of changes in urban and rural fertility in 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in many cases going back to the mid-or late-1980s, show that the changes are typically but not exclusively declines, and vary substantially in magnitude and pace. Using individual-level data, we decompose the fertility changes into portions due to increasing women's schooling and declining infant and child mortality, while controlling for changes in the mean age of women of reproductive age as an additional factor influencing changes in our measure of fertility, children ever born.
The analyses document that fertility decline is more rapid in urban areas than in rural places. While both increased women's schooling and reduced mortality contribute to fertility decline, in urban areas the importance of women's education tends more frequently to be greater, while in rural places reduced mortality tends, on average, to play a modestly more important role than increased schooling in contributing to fertility decline. We note that the increases in educational attainment tend to be greater in urban places, while the declines in infant and child mortality are greater in rural areas.
We estimate the impact of educational attainment and mortality on cumulative fertility using a six-category scheme to represent educational attainment rather than the trichotomy (none/primary/secondary+) that is often used to characterize schooling. This more detailed representation of education shows that as educational attainment increases through the secondary level and beyond, fertility differences by education tend to widen. This suggests that as educational attainment rises to the secondary level and beyond for many women, the pace of fertility decline may well accelerate.
Fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa, late in getting started relative to elsewhere in the developing world, has been comparatively slow and subject to stalling. As continued high fertility in the region is an obstacle to efforts to promote socioeconomic development and economic growth, policies seeking to encourage lower fertility constitute efforts to facilitate growth and development. The analyses here suggest that continued and augmented efforts to increase women's schooling and reduce infant and child mortality will generate more rapid fertility decline. We believe that such fertility decline will contribute to more rapid socioeconomic development.
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